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An Economic and Constitutional Case for Repeal
of the I.R.C. Section 170 Deduction for Charitable
Contributions to Religious Organizations
E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The charitable contribution deduction for contributions made to
religious, educational and other charitable organizations was en-
acted in 19171 and, hence, has a history nearly as long as the in-
come tax. Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code, within limits,
allows a deduction for charitable contributions. A charitable con-
tribution is a contribution or gift to or for the use of-
1. A State, a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision
thereof, or the United States or District of Columbia provided the contribu-
tion or gift is made exclusively for public purposes
2. A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation: (A) cre-
ated or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or under
the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or any
possession of the United States; (B) organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of
its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals; (C) no part of the net earn-
ings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual;
and (D) which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3)
by reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not partici-
pate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of state-
ments), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office
3. A post or organization of war veterans, or an auxiliary unit or society of,
or trust of foundation for, any such post or organization: (A) organized in
the United States or any of its possessions, and (B) no part of the net earn-
ings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual
4. In the case of a contribution or gift by an individual, a domestic fraternal
society, order, or association, operating under the lodge system, but only if
such contribution or gift is to be used exclusively for religious, charitable,
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1. Act of October 3, 1917, ch. 63, tit. XII, § 1201 (2), 40 Stat. 330.
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scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals
5. A cemetery company owned and operated exclusively for the benefit of its
members, or any corporation chartered solely for burial purposes as a ceme-
tery corporation and not permitted by its charter to engage in any business
not necessarily incident to that purpose, if such company or corporation is
not operated for profit and no part of the net earnings of such company or
corporation inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
2
Other tax exempt organizations do not qualify to receive deduct-
ible charitable contributions. A contribution or gift to an individ-
ual regardless of how needy or charitable the purpose, is not de-
ductible. A contribution to a foreign charitable organization is not
deductible; however, United States-based charitable organizations
may use charitable contributions abroad except for contributions
by corporations to a trust, chest, fund, or foundation which must
be used within the United States or its possessions. However, a
domestic charitable organization may not act as a mere conduit for
transferring contributions to a foreign organization. 3
Limitations are imposed on the amount deductible by individu-
als based on the type of property which is contributed, the use to
which the contributed property is put by the donee, and the kind
of charitable organization receiving the contribution." Corporations
are limited to a maximum deduction equal to ten percent of taxa-
ble income computed without regard for charitable deductions,
most special deductions for corporations (sections 241-47, 249,
250), section 172 net operating carrybacks, or section 1212(a)(1)
capital loss carrybacks.6
The growing importance of the charitable contribution deduc-
tion can be seen by comparing amounts deducted over a period of
years. In 1970, the aggregate amount deducted was $12.9 billion.'
In 1980, the aggregate amount deducted doubled to $25.8 billion.7
In the five years between 1980 and 1985, the amount deducted has
almost doubled again to $50.0 billion.
8
2. I.R.C. § 170 (1986).
3. See Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 C.B. 101.
4. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (1986).
5. Id. § 170(b)(2).
6. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME - 1970: INDIVIDUAL TAX RE-
TURNS 127 (1972).
7. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME - 1980: INDIVIDUAL TAX RE-
TURNS 57 (1982).




Charitable giving in 1970 amounted to $21.0 billion.' This
amount more than doubled to $49 billion in 1980.10 As did the
amount of charitable contributions deducted in 1985, charitable
giving nearly doubled again over its 1980 figure to $79.8 billion."
First reports of charitable giving in 1987 indicate that a record
amount of $93.7 billion was donated." Nearly one half ($37.7 bil-
lion in 1985) of all charitable giving goes to religious organizations,
while educational organizations, hospitals, health organizations,
and social welfare organizations combined account for approxi-
mately thirty-eight percent ($31 billion in 1985) of the total."3
Charitable giving consistently amounts to approximately two per-
cent of gross national product.'
The magnitude of the deduction for charitable contributions to
religious organizations alone makes it worthwhile examining in
terms of effectiveness and necessity of purpose. This article exam-
ines the charitable contribution deduction for contributions made
to religious organizations as a tax expenditure item. The four part
analysis examines the rationale for and goal of the deduction, the
effectiveness in accomplishing the goal, the desired level of govern-
ment involvement, if any, and the constitutional issues involved.
II. TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS
The Internal Revenue Code is in fact two documents. The pri-
mary function of the code is to describe the normative tax attrib-
utes of the revenue system. The remainder of the code consists of
tax expenditure items 5 for the benefit of, and tax penalties im-
posed on, special activities or groups.
Normative tax items deal with the structure of the tax, the es-
tablishment of the tax base (what is income), the tax accounting
period, accounting concepts applicable to the accounting period,
9. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF FUND-RAISING COUNSEL, GIVING U.SA.: ESTIMATES OF
PHILANTHROPIC GIVING IN 1985 AND THE TRENDS THEY SHOW 41 (1986) [hereinafter 1985
GIVING REPORT].
10. Id.
11. Id. at 6.
12. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF FUND-RAISING COUNSEL, GIVING U.S.A.: ESTIMATES OF
PHILANTHROPIC GIVING IN 1987 AND THE TRENDS THEY SHOW 41 (1988).
13. 1985 GIVING REPORT, supra note 9, at 7.
14. Id. at 41.
15. "[Tax expenditures are those] revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Fed-
eral tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or
which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, § 3(a)(3).
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definition of the taxable unit, rate structures, international tax
consequences, and appropriate administrative procedures to give
effect to the revenue provisions. All other items are tax expendi-
tures or penalties and constitute a deviation from the normative
tax system.
A tax expenditure item is designed to provide indirect govern-
ment assistance through the tax system to a particular group or
activity, to provide an incentive for economic reallocation of re-
sources, or to penalize certain activity. In effect, a tax expenditure
item is a congressional fiscal policy disguised as a tax policy. 6 One
must be careful not to confuse tax reform with indirect budget
spending. Discussion of tax expenditure items does not fall within
the rhetoric of tax reform, but instead should be characterized in
appropriations language because tax reform properly only deals
with normative tax items. What is being discussed here is congres-
sional fiscal policy, not tax policy or reform.
It was not until 1968 that the Treasury Department compiled
the first tax expenditure budget. The Congressional Budget Act of
197417 made the tax expenditure concept an integral part of the
congressional budget process. In addition to the requirement that a
tax expenditure must be included in the congressional budget, the
President is also required to include tax expenditures in the an-
nual budget submitted to Congress.' 8 But even under this statu-
tory mandate, the tax expenditure lists are remarkably deficient
when it comes to accounting for charitable contributions and tax-
exempt organizations. Charitable contributions are only accounted
for under education, social services, and health. The greatest omis-
sion though is the absence of any tax expenditure item relating to
tax-exempt organizations. Tax expenditure lists have never in-
cluded any item related to non-profit, tax-exempt organizations or
charitable contributions to religious organizations; moreover, no
explanation has ever been given for the omission. One might spec-
ulate that the reason for the omission is that in terms of magni-
tude the loss of income is very high and so remains hidden from
16. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FIVE YEAR BUDGET PROJECTIONS, SUPPLEMENT
ON TAX EXPENDITURES 1 (1977):
[A] tax expenditure is analogous to an entitlement program on the spending side of
the budget; the amount expended is not subject to any legislated limit but is depen-
dent solely upon taxpayer response to the particular provision. In this respect, tax
expenditures closely resemble spending programs that have no ceiling.
Id.
17. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (1982)).




There are some commentators who argue that this omission from
the tax expenditure list is proper. Professor William Andrews, for
example, argues that charitable contributions should not be con-
sidered consumption."9 If they are not consumption, then the
amount of the charitable contribution is not part of the normative
tax base,2" and, therefore, the charitable contribution deduction is
not a tax expenditure item.2 1 Andrews admits that his concept of
an ideal personal income tax base differs from the Simons defini-
tion of income.2 2 Andrews has changed the meaning of consump-
tion from the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of net of expenditure
over costs incurred in the earning or production of income to a
"standard of living" concept.2" Andrews' argument is simply that
the donor's standard of living is unaffected by a charitable contri-
bution, and hence, there is no consumption which inures to the
benefit of the donor.
24
There is no congressional support for this position. If Congress
wanted to exclude charitable contributions from the normative tax
base, it could have excluded it from income or treated it as an
"above the line" deduction under section 62 so that all taxpayers
benefit, not just itemizers. Deductions for charitable contributions
to religious organizations should be included in the list of tax ex-
penditure items. To the extent that charitable contributions to re-
ligious organizations represent consumption for the donors in the
19. See Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309,
314-15 (1972) [hereinafter Andrews].
20. Using a Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income, modified to fit the tax code,
income is the algebraic sum of the market value of rights exercised in consumption plus the
change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the
period in question. Under this definition, income is the sum of the net change in wealth
from the beginning of the period to the end of the period plus consumption during that
period. For tax purposes, this economic definition of income must be modified so that it
may be used in the normative tax provisions. Consumption means the net of expenditures
over costs incurred in the earning or production of income. Also excluded from the defini-
tion are certain items of income that have not been historically treated as income in the
United States. The Treasury Department has cited only two such items: unrealized appreci-
ation in asset values during a person's lifetime and imputed income from homes or other
durable consumer assets. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS G: TAX
EXPENDITURES, SPECIAL ANALYSIS, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 1984 at G-2-
G-3.
21. See Andrews, supra note 19, at 314-15.
22. Id. at 315.
23. See Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments
and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C.L. REV. 225, 261 n.88 (1979).
24. Id. at 314.
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Simons sense of consumption, and to the extent that they are un-
taxed as a result of the deduction, those amounts are excluded
from the normative tax base, thereby resulting in tax expenditure
items.
Just because an item appears as a tax expenditure does not
mean that it is necessarily bad. What it does mean is that each tax
expenditure item should be treated as if it were a direct appropria-
tion item. This is so for numerous reasons. First, whether recog-
nized by Congress or not, a tax expenditure item has the highest
priority of any spending item.25 Because the revenue is simply
never collected, it always has first priority over any budgeted item
for which the revenue must be collected and then appropriated.
Second, there is a lack of control over the distribution of the tax
expenditure item.2" It is left in the hands of the private sector
without effective government control. Third, tax expenditure items
virtually escape any deficit reduction attempt because of the mind-
set that deficit reduction applies only to direct appropriation
items.2 7 Fourth, there is a filter effect where first order recipients
of a tax expenditure item extract a high price for providing the
service; that is, there is in effect a private sector middleman in al-
most every tax expenditure item.28 Fifth, the Internal Revenue
Service is involved in businesses other than revenue collection and
administration.2 9 For example, in the charitable contribution area,
the Internal Revenue Service is engaged in activities dealing with
the regulation of charitable deductions and in writing regulations
that determine who is entitled to a charitable deduction and to
what extent. This type of activity unnecessarily burdens the Ser-
vice with items outside of the revenue area and in areas in which
the Service does not have the requisite expertise.3 0 Sixth, tax ex-
penditure items that should be administered by other administra-
tive agencies (for example HUD or HEW) are dealt with by the
Internal Revenue Service and are treated in tax committees in
Congress rather than the substantive committees that are properly
assigned that particular subject area." For example, tax commit-
25. See S. SURREY AND P. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 32-37 (1985) [hereinafter TAX
EXPENDITURES].
26. Id. at 33-34.
27. Id. at 48-54.
28. Id. at 83.
29. Id. at 70.




tees are writing housing regulations, regulating charity, and are in-
volved in religion.
Tax assistance through the tax expenditure items is legally
equivalent to direct assistance. Therefore, tax expenditure items
must be individually examined to determine whether or not: (1)
the goal is compatible with congressional intent, i.e., what social
service is desired or intended?; (2) the tax expenditure item or
preference group accomplishes the goal?; (3) if the goal is desirable
and the preference group can attain that goal, which is preferable:
a direct expenditure with government supervision or an indirect
tax expenditure with little or no government oversight?; and (4)
the tax expenditure preference item or exemption would be consti-
tutional if it were a direct expenditure?
A. Is the Goal Compatible with Congressional Intent?
To answer this question, we must determine what social service
Congress desired or intended by granting a deduction for charita-
ble contributions to religious organizations. The House of Repre-
sentatives in its report32 in 1938 articulated the rationale for the
charitable contribution deduction:
The exemption from taxation on money or property devoted to charitable
and other purposes is based on the theory that the Government is compen-
sated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the
benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.3
This rationale does not support privatization whereby the govern-
ment transfers a government function to the private sector which
can provide the service or product more efficiently than the gov-
ernment. Nor are costs shifted from the public treasury to the pri-
vate sector. What is involved is a decision to subsidize religious
organizations through a tax expenditure in lieu of a direct appro-
priation for social welfare services.
From what financial burden is the government relieved by grant-
ing a deduction for charitable contributions to religious organiza-
tions? Direct appropriations for religious purposes raise constitu-
tional questions, so the government financial burden relieved
should be limited to secular activities.3 " But leaving the constitu-
tional questions aside for the moment, what social services do reli-
32. H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
33. Id. at 19.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 111-22.
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gious organizations provide that Congress should subsidize?
It is assumed without elaboration that religious organizations
provide social welfare services to the community.35 The Supreme
Court tells us that section 170 "simply makes plain what common
sense and history tell us: . . .[that] Congress sought to provide tax
benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the development
"136of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose ....
Chief Justice Burger in discussing the tax exemption in Walz v.
Tax Commission of the City of New York3 7 said:
[Ilt [is] unnecessary to justify the tax exemption on the social welfare ser-
vices or 'good works' that some churches perform for parishioners and
others - family counselling, aid to the elderly and the infirm, and to chil-
dren. . . . To give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the work of religious
bodies would introduce an element of governmental evaluation and stan-
dards as to the worth of particular social welfare programs, thus producing
a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality
seeks to minimize. Hence, the use of a social welfare yardstick ...could
conceivably give rise to confrontations that could escalate to constitutional
dimensions.3
This statement is particularly illuminating considering that Chief
Justice Burger in Bob Jones University v. Unites States39 stated
that sections 170 and 501(c)(3) must be construed together.4 If so,
the relief from financial burdens for social welfare programs ele-
ment of the congressional rationale would not apply to deductions
for charitable contributions made to religious organizations, and
we must look only to the promotion of the general welfare. But it is
not so easy to dismiss the congressional intent. It may not be nec-
essary to examine each church individually, as Chief Justice Bur-
ger feared, but rather to examine them as a class which Congress
has decided does provide social services otherwise compensable out
of the public treasury.
The congressional intent in enacting the charitable deduction
was to subsidize social services which could be appropriated from
the public treasury. 41 The government cannot operate a church.
35. E.g., Justice Brennan, concurring in Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S.
664, 687 (1970), said categorically that religious organizations provide nonreligious services
to the community that would otherwise have to be met by general taxation. He did not
elaborate.
36. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1983).
37. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
38. Id. at 674.
39. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
40. Id. at 587 n.11.
41. See supra note 32.
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Worship cannot be supported by direct appropriation. Neverthe-
less, part of every dollar donated to religious organizations goes to
support worship or other religious activities. Section 170 does not
distinguish between contributions to religious organizations which
support worship and those that support social services. All are de-
ductible. Congress, through section 170, subsidizes religion. The
goal far exceeds the congressional intent.
Family counseling, aid to the elderly and infirm, et cetera, can
be and are done by other charitable organizations without religious
entanglement. If the goal is simply to provide social services in-
stead of subsidizing religion, as between equally efficient convey-
ers, Congress should be neutral. But religious organizations are less
efficient on a cost/benefit analysis than other charitable organiza-
tions because a large portion of every dollar donated to religious
organizations is devoted to worship. This defeats the efficiency ra-
tionale for shifting the social welfare burden to the private sector
to cut government overhead and costs, and makes the goal incom-
patible with congressional intent.2
The second part of the congressional rationale for the charitable
deduction is that the activities of the charitable organization pro-
mote the general welfare. 43 One often hears the argument that reli-
gion is the buffer between human nature and the state. Without a
belief in an ultimate reward in an afterlife for the sufferings and
deprivations in this life, the poor, homeless and disenfranchised
would rise up and bring down the government and their oppres-
sors. Of course, history teaches us a different lesson. Organized re-
ligion did not save Louis XVI and the French aristocracy anymore
than it did Czar Nicholas II and the Russian boyers, primarily be-
cause organized religion was entwined with the state.
Nevertheless, our Declaration of Independence, constitution and
governmental institutions are predicated on the existence of a Su-
preme Being. Mr. Justice Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson" said:
"When the state encourages religious instruction . . . it follows the
best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of
our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual
needs. ' '45 Mr. Justice Brennan in Walz said:
(Rieligious organizations ... uniquely contribute to the pluralism of Amer-
42. See infra text accompanying notes 104-08.
43. See supra note 32.
44. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
45. Id. at 313-14.
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ican society by their religious activities. . . . During their ordinary opera-
tions, most churches engage in activities of a secular nature that benefit the
community; and all churches by their existence contribute to the diversity
of association, viewpoint, and enterprise so highly valued by all of us ...
Viewed in this light, there is no nonreligious substitute for religion as an
element in our societal mosaic .... 46
From another viewpoint, religion is one of the atavistic elements
of today's cohesive social entities. 7 The social code underwritten
by religious values is elevated to a higher level than the individ-
ual's life, making possible group loyalty and individual sacrifice for
the group's sake.48 This group loyalty contributed to the cohesive-
ness of the nascent nation-state.4 9 But in a pluralistic society, the
sense of social unity and purpose has a dark side. The concept of
social unity and purpose breeds an isolationism and contempt for
those who are not a part of the group. One sect is pitted against
another and all against the nonbelievers. Intolerance rips the fabric
of a pluralistic society.
American society is more complex and stressful today than when
the charitable contribution deduction was written into the Internal
Revenue Code. Complexity is the result of being affiliated with a
multitude of groups and organizations each with its own alle-
giances and competing demands. The bonds of loyalty to family,
church, state, employer and land are strained. None can command
an unswerving loyalty from the individual anymore. In today's so-
ciety, religion plays a lesser role than in times past. 1 Stress results
from the more detailed, technical government regulation of all
parts of life, work, and play. Increased government regulation of
life results in more and more government entanglement with reli-
gion and religious values. But when government and religion get
tangled the worst is brought out. James Madison did not think the
goal compatible with government intent to subsidize religious ac-
tivities when he wrote:
46. Waltz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 689, 692-93 (1970).
47. See Wilson, Religion, Rational Society, and the Modern Concept of Peace, 3 INT'L
J. ON WORLD PEACE 67, 72 (1986).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 72-73.
51. A Gallup poll taken in 1985 revealed that only 55% of the population viewed reli-
gion as important in their lives. Between 1947 and 1985, the number of Protestants fell
17%, while the number of Jews fell 60%. The number of Catholics increased 40%, but they




[E]xperience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of main-
taining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation.
During almost fifteen centuries, has the legal establishment of Christianity
been on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride
and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity, in both,
superstition, bigotry and persecution. Enquire of the Teachers of Christian-
ity for the ages in which it appeared in its greatest lustre; those of every
sect, point to the ages prior to its incorporation with Civil policy. Propose a
restoration to this primitive state in which its Teachers depended on the
voluntary rewards of their flocks; many of them predict its downfall. On
which side ought their testimony to have greatest weight, when for or when
against their interest.2
Reasonable men might differ as to whether or not the goal is com-
patible with congressional intent, but on which side ought their
testimony have greatest weight?
B. Does It Accomplish the Goal?
1. Equitably
The principal lesson to be derived from the tax expenditure analysis . . . is
that deductions (or exclusions) in the individual income tax are inferior de-
vices for implementing objectives extraneous to those of the tax itself....
It will not generally make sense to distribute government funds according to
the graduated rates in the personal income tax unless the purpose of the
distribution is intrinsically related to the distribution of tax burdens that
those rates are designed to effect.5
3
Tax expenditure analysis shows that the section 170 deduction
primarily benefits high income taxpayers." If the object is to fund
charitable contributions out of the pockets of the rich at a lesser
cost to them than to middle and low income taxpayers, then the
policy is a success. The charitable contribution deduction has an
upside-down effect in that taxpayers most able to afford to make
charitable contributions reap the benefit of the deduction by incur-
ring a lower price of contributing. The least able to afford to make
the contributions bear a higher cost. For example, a high income,
itemizing taxpayer has a cost per dollar of charitable contributions
of 1-MR, where MR is the taxpayer's marginal rate, while a low
52. Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 183-191 (G. Hunt ed. 1901), as reproduced in the Appendix to the dis-
senting opinion of Rutledge, J., in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67-68 (1947).
53. Andrews, supra note 19, at 311.
54. In 1984, taxpayers with annual incomes of more that $50,000 (less than five per-
cent of all taxpayers) accounted for 54.9% of all charitable contributions. See TAX EXPENDI-
TURES, supra note 25, at 72.
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income, nonitemizing taxpayer has a cost per dollar of charitable
contribution of one dollar. While it is true that the lower rate
schedule in effect after the passage of the Tax Reform Act of
1986" reduces the upside-down effect to some extent, it makes
more taxpayers nonitemizers because of increased personal exemp-
tions and standard deductions, thereby increasing their cost of giv-
ing. Yet, repeal of the charitable contribution would result only in
a seven percent reduction in contributions made to religious orga-
nizations51 because nearly three-fourths of contributions to reli-
gious organizations come from low income taxpayers.5 7 Accord-
ingly, high income taxpayers reap a tax windfall virtually unrelated
to the congressional purpose of shifting the cost of public welfare
programs supported by religious organizations to private individu-
als or promoting the general welfare. The section 170 deduction for
charitable contributions to religious organizations simply does not
provide the incentive to give to religious organizations. That incen-
tive lies in the individual's moral and religious values as a matter
of conscience.
2. Economically
Economic studies show that charitable contributions, in general,
are increased substantially by the section 170 deduction. 58 More-
over, to use the best case scenario, the efficiency of the section 170
deduction is greater that 100 percent so that the amount received
by charitable organizations exceeds the amount of revenue lost by
the government.9
It is generally agreed that the amount of charitable contributions
in the aggregate is quite sensitive to the tax treatment. Estimates
55. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2095 (1986).
56. See Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part H - The Im-
pact on Religious, Educational and Other Organizations, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 209, 221, 224
(1975) [hereinafter Feldstein Part II].
57. See infra text accompanying notes 67-69.
58. See Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part I - Aggre-
gate and Distributional Effects, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 81, 82 (1975) [hereinafter Feldstein Part I];
Boskin and Feldstein, Effects of the Charitable Deduction on Contributions by Low and
Middle Income Households: Evidence from the National Survey of Philanthropy, 59 RE-
VIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 351, 354 (1977); C. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND
CHARITABLE GIVING 274, 276 (1985) [hereinafter CLOTFELTER].
59. Feldstein Part I, supra note 58, at 82. Contra Taussig, Economic Aspects of the
Personal Income Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 1 (1967).
Taussig found the efficiency to be very low. He reported that charities only received five
cents on the dollar for every dollar of revenue lost by the government. Taussig himself
warns the reader about shortcomings and biases in his work.
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of reductions in charitable giving resulting from the repeal of sec-
tion 170 are between twenty-five and fifty percent of total individ-
ual giving." The issue here is not charitable giving in the aggre-
gate, but rather charitable giving to religious organizations. It is
the effect of repeal of section 170 on the distribution of charitable
contributions that concerns us as an indication of what the result
of selective repeal would be.
For those itemizers who take advantage of the charitable contri-
bution deduction, the price elasticity is -1, which means that the
amount of the total charitable contribution deduction remains con-
stant with respect to the deductibility of the contribution. 1 What
happens is that charitable contributions are redistributed away
from educational and cultural organizations because the sensitivity
of charitable giving to changes in the tax treatment varies depend-
ing on the type of donee. The tax expenditure budget for 1977
showed that more than seventy-three percent of charitable contri-
butions came from the top 1.4 percent of the taxpayer population
by income." Loss of deductibility of charitable contributions to
educational institutions and hospitals would result in a precipitous
drop in charitable contributions to these organizations. Total re-
peal of section 170 would affect educational institutions and hospi-
tals (up to a sixty-five percent reduction) far more than religious
organizations (seven percent reduction)." It is expected that the
lower rate schedule of the Tax Reform Act of 19865 will result in a
lesser amount of charitable contributions to educational and cul-
tural organizations because it raises the price of the charitable con-
tribution to high income taxpayers.66
Contributions to religious organizations are primarily made by
60. Feldstein Part I, supra note 58, at 97; Feldstein and Clotfelter, Tax Incentives
and Charitable Contributions in the United States, 5 J. OF PUB. ECONOMICS 1, 24 (1976).
61. Feldstein Part II, supra note 56, at 209-10.
62. Id. at 224.
63. See TAx EXPENDITURES, supra note 25, at 71.
64. Feldstein Part II, supra note 56, at 209, 221, 224.
65. The prior rates ranged from 11% to 50% with as many as 15 brackets. The current
structure has two rate brackets at 15% and 28%; however, some taxpayers may have a mar-
ginal rate of 33% as a result of the two five percent surcharges. See I.R.C. § 1 (1986).
66. The cost of charitable giving is equal to I-MR, where MR is the taxpayer's margi-
nal tax rate, i.e., the taxpayer may either have 1-MR cash in hand or donate one dollar to
charity. The highest marginal tax rate in 1988 is 28%, down from 50% in 1986; therefore,
the cost of a charitable contribution has risen from fifty cents on the dollar (1-.50) to sev-
enty-two cents on the dollar (1-.28). This increase in the cost of charitable contributions is
expected to have a substantial negative impact on charitable giving.
1989
Duquesne Law Review
low income taxpayers. 7 Studies show that the section 170 deduc-
tion for charitable contributions to religious organizations does not
substantially affect the behavior of the majority of donors. In 1962,
approximately fifty-six million out of the sixty-two million taxpay-
ers who filed returns had annual incomes of less than $10,000.8 Of
this group, only thirty-eight percent itemized but accounted for
seventy-four percent of all charitable contributions to religious or-
ganizations. 9 The important statistic is that their marginal rates
were very low, making the cost 70 of giving high. Consequently, the
repeal of section 170 with respect to contributions to religious or-
ganizations would have little effect since the difference in the cost
of giving would be small.71 Such donors will give to their respective
churches or religious organizations notwithstanding the deductibil-
ity of their contribution. In addition, substantial amounts of chari-
table contributions to religious organizations come from nonitemiz-
ing taxpayers who, since the termination of the direct charitable
deduction 72 on December 31, 1986, do not benefit from section 170.
Clearly, the rationale that the deduction for charitable contribu-
tions to religious organizations relieves the government of any fi-
nancial burden which would have to be met otherwise by appropri-
ations, if constitutional, is false. In fact, the contributions are
made in any event, and the government forgoes a significant
amount of income, the amount of which is admittedly significant
but not readily ascertainable because of the lack of data.7"
3. Philosophically
The economic argument used for individuals is not valid for cor-
porations. The economic literature shows that the corporate tax
has a price and net-income effect on corporate giving.74 Corporate
67. In 1962, 82% of gifts to religious organizations came from taxpayers having annual
incomes of less than $15,000, while 74% came from taxpayers with annual incomes of less
than $10,000. Feldstein Part II, supra note 56, at 214. Fifty-six percent of the people having
annual incomes of less than $10,000 give a high priority to giving to religious organizations.
See 1985 GIVING REPORT, supra note 9, at 53.
68. Feldstein Part II, supra note 56, at 224.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 66.
71. Id.
72. I.R.C. § 170(i) (1986).
73. See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 25, at 220; Feldstein Part II, supra note 56, at
210. If one-half of aggregate charitable contributions deducted in 1985 went to religious
organizations, as do nearly 50% of all charitable contributions, the treasury lost tax reve-
nues on approximately $25 billion.
74. See C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 58, at 275.
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charitable contributions are proportional to after tax income."
Moreover, corporations do not have a standard deduction; hence,
every dollar of charitable contributions is deductible up to the
statutory limit so that the problem of equity between individual
taxpayers who itemize and those who do not does not arise in the
corporate context. But there are compelling reasons why corpora-
tions should not be permitted to take a charitable contribution de-
duction for contributions to religious organizations.
There are fundamental differences between individuals and cor-
porations. Corporations are creatures of the state, created for
profit with authority to operate only within the parameters set
forth in state law so that corporate decision-making is thereby lim-
ited. Individuals are endowed with freedom of choice and "owe
their existence to a higher sovereign [than the state]. 76 Professor
Jeffrey Nesteruk has analyzed and compared the decision-making
process of individuals and corporations by examining the corporate
analogues of individual reason and desire in the corporate con-
text.77 He equates desire with profit seeking shareholders, and rea-
son with corporate management charged with making the daily
corporate decisions,"7 and concludes that the corporate decision-
making process distorts the dynamics of individual moral choice.79
75. Id.
76. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 828 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
77. Professor Nesteruk describes the roles of desire and reason in individuals as
follows:
All individuals experience tensions, at least at times, between what they want to do
and what they ought to do. This tension may be expressed as a conflict between rea-
son and desire. Desire is the motivational, wanting aspect of the psyche, while reason
is the evaluating aspect, the setter of standards. To do what is right entails using
reason to evaluate either conflicting desires or conflicts between desires and some
standard of proper behavior. For while each desire has as its aim some end-it can
only want such an end-not evaluate its worthiness. The evaluation of competing
ends is reason's role.
Nesteruk, Bellotti and the Question of Corporate Moral Agency, 1989 COLum. Bus. L. REV.
683, 690-91 (1988).
78. Id. at 691.
79. The distortion is caused by the separation of ownership and control in the modern
corporation which results in the lack of an intimate and interactive relationship between the
two corporate analogues of reason and desire-management and shareholders-whereas in a
natural person reason and desire are united and reason's evaluation of the ends of desire is
an act of self-determination. Professor Nesteruk describes two distortions-the distortion of
displaced reason and the distortion of unrestrained desire. The distortion of displaced rea-
son is the result of the corporate analogue of reason-management-usurping the function
of desire by not having to respond to the multiple personal ends of the individual sharehold-
ers who do not meaningfully participate in modern corporate decision-making. The second
distortion-the distortion of unrestrained desire-also is caused by the separation of control
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This conclusion leads him to the further conclusion, of importance
here, that corporations are not moral agents.8 0
A moral agent is an entity capable of making a moral choice
based on a concept of right and wrong. This issue is important be-
cause the value of the first amendment religious freedoms as well
as other individual rights and freedoms is premised on the concept
of moral agency." To have a religious belief presumes the ability to
embrace moral choice. Corporations, being mere creatures of the
state, must operate within the parameters of state corporation law
and are, therefore, incapable of making decisions based on moral
considerations. They are constrained by the framework of the
profit motive.
The landmark case in this area is Dodge v. Ford Motor Com-
pany. 2 The issue in the case was whether or not a corporation or-
ganized for profit could divert its profits from the shareholders to
society-at-large. The court drew a distinction between incidental
humanitarian expenditure of corporate funds for the benefit of em-
ployees and a general purpose plan to benefit mankind. a The
court was clear when it stated:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit
of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to
attain that end and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the
reduction of profits or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders
in order to devote them to other purposes. . . . [Ilt is not within the lawful
powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corpora-
tion for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary
purpose of benefiting others ..... 84
from ownership in the modern corporation. The shareholder desire for profit is a controlling
end for management which only may choose among means to that end rather than among
competing ends. The dynamic of the moral agent is then reversed because desire determines
the legitimacy of reason's actions rather than reason evaluating desire. Id. at 696-99.
80. Id. at 701.
81. James Madison wrote in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments:
Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every
man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is
in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable; because the opinions of men,
depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds, cannot follow the
dictates of other men.
2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (G. Hunt ed. 1901), as reproduced in the Appendix to
the dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J., in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947).
82. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
83. Id. at 506-507, 170 N.W. at 684.
84. Id. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
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This statement is in effect a reflection of the underlying moral
agency issue. Corporations are restricted to deciding the means to
the end but not what the end is to be, for that is decided by the
state.
More recent cases 85 tend toward a social responsibility theory for
corporations. Nonetheless, the profit motive remains the driving
force behind corporate existence, and social responsibility is con-
strained by reasonableness.86 The reasonableness test, however,
should be applied within the framework of moral agency because
what is reasonable is a value judgment. Corporations should be
prohibited from making decisions involving individual freedom of
conscience because they do not have an "intellect" or "mind"87 and
are, therefore, incapable of exercising individual freedom of con-
science. It would be unreasonable to expect or allow a corporation
to make a decision which ordinarily involves the exercise of indi-
vidual freedom of conscience.
Making a charitable contribution to a religious organization is an
exercise of the individual freedom of conscience. Giving to a reli-
gious organization is predicated on a belief in certain religious te-
nants and dogma and their propagation. Corporations not being
moral agents cannot make value judgments, have religious beliefs,
or worship. To allow corporations to make charitable contributions
to religious organizations undermines the concept of individual
conscience which is at the base of religious belief. Economic stud-
ies of corporate charitable giving confirm this.
The economic literature shows that the corporate tax has a price
and net-income effect on corporate giving.8 8 Corporate charitable
contributions are proportional to after tax income,89 and corpora-
tions tend to make charitable contributions when doing so has a
positive effect on after-tax profits.90 In a study of corporate contri-
butions during the period 1936-1961, Professor Orace Johnson es-
tablished that only in years of high marginal tax rates on excess
85. See, e.g., Theodore Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969).
86. "ITihe test to be applied in passing on the validity of a gift such as the one here at
issue is that of reasonableness .. " Id. at 405.
87. Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Util.
Comm'n of California, 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) makes this point by saying: "To ascribe to such
artificial entities an 'intellect' or 'mind' for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse
metaphor with reality." Id.





profits has corporate giving approached the five 91 percent statutory
limit,92 and that corporate giving dropped precipitously in the
years for which the excess profits tax was removed." Corporate
giving is bottom line oriented. Moreover, the amount of corporate
giving seems to be related to the competitive position of the firm in
the industry.
In Adam Smith's ideal world of pure competition, no corporate
giving would be tolerated since to make a charitable contribution is
to raise the cost of goods and price oneself out of the market. Mo-
nopolists, at the other extreme, have no incentive to make charita-
ble contributions if they are profit maximizers. The only corpora-
tions with an incentive to make charitable contributions are the so-
called "rival" firms. The rival firms are corporations that are oligo-
polistic,94 imperfectly or monopolistically competitive, 95 which seek
a comparative advantage over each other by such means as contri-
butions, public relations, advertising, and innovative marketing
and management.9 6 Professor Johnson has established that these
predictions are true."7 Corporate charitable giving, consistent with
corporate status, is motivated by profits.
The profit motive is diametrically opposed to the values underly-
ing first amendment religious freedom and the charitable contribu-
tion deduction for contributions made to religious organizations.
At a minimum, so much of I.R.C. section 170 which allows corpora-
tions to take deductions for charitable contributions to religious
organizations should be repealed.
C. Direct or Indirect Expenditure?
In 1917, Congress decided to opt for the indirect expenditure of
government funds for charitable purposes through the predecessor
of section 170.98 It is highly unlikely that this decision was a con-
91. The corporate limit is currently 10%. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) (1986).
92. See Johnson, Corporate Philanthropy: An Analysis of Corporate Contributions,
39 J. Bus. 489, 492 (1966) [hereinafter Johnson).
93. Id.
94. An oligopoly is a market where there are only a few competing producers so each
producer must take into account what each other producer does. See B.T. ALLEN, MANAGE-
RIAL ECONOMICS 117 (1988) [hereinafter MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS].
95. Monopolistic competition is the result of having many sellers of only slightly dif-
ferentiated products but not enough sellers to make the market purely competitive. See
MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS, supra note 94, at 116-17.
96. Johnson, supra note 92, at 497.
97. Id. at 496-98.
98. See supra note 1.
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scious one involving even rudimentary tax expenditure analysis.
Rather, Congress was simply carrying on the American tradition of
private philanthropy for the public good. Historically, religious and
other charitable organizations devoted a great deal of their re-
sources to relief of the poor and infirm and to education. Congress
continued the tradition with an indirect tax subsidy, through what
is now section 170, to encourage private donations to charitable
organizations.
One of the basic problems with the section 170 deduction is dis-
tribution. High income taxpayer sensitivity to the cost of giving (1-
MR) causes shifts in giving patterns,99 causing problems in deliver-
ing services where needed or desired most. Educational institutions
which have a high national priority are among the most affected.100
The exception to this pattern is giving to religious organizations,
which is resistant to changes in the cost of giving. 10 1 The distribu-
tion problem, which could be solved by government regulation of
gift allocation or more simply by changing the indirect tax subsidy
to a direct spending program, does not pertain to the issue of par-
tial repeal of section 170 because of the price inelasticity of giving
to religious organizations.
During the great depression it became painfully obvious that the
private sector could not cope with the volume of people forced
onto the welfare rolls. At that point, Congress opted for direct ex-
penditures in social welfare services, most notably the social secur-
ity system.102 Today the private and public welfare systems exist
side by side, and both systems involve government revenues. Costs
of private social welfare programs provided by charitable organiza-
tions are not shifted from the treasury to the private sector. The
choice here is not one of privatization whereby a government func-
tion, performed at zero or below full-cost prices, is transferred to
the private sector at prices which reflect the true cost of produc-
tion. 10 3 The choice between direct and indirect expenditure does
not alter the source of funds which is still the public treasury.
There are two efficiency issues to be explored. The first is the
efficiency of the section 170 deduction. The cost/benefit question
involved is whether or not charitable organizations receive more
99. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
100. Id.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
102. See Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).




money as a result of the section 170 deduction than the govern-
ment loses in revenue. It has generally been thought that the sec-
tion 170 deduction is inefficient, but recent economic studies show
that it may be more efficient than previously thought.0" The price
elasticity clustering about -1.1 means that more than 100 percent
of the amount forgone by the treasury is donated to charitable or-
ganizations. 10 5 The efficiency of the cost/benefit of the deduction
pales, however, when compared with the inefficiency of charitable
organizations, particularly religious institutions.0 6 Every tax ex-
penditure item has a middleman involved who delivers the in-
tended government benefit to the ultimate consumer or benefi-
ciary. In the case of the charitable contributions deduction, the
middleman is the charitable organization which incurs administra-
tive and overhead costs of its own. Charitable organizations, gener-
ally, are less efficient than for-profit enterprises because market
pressures do not force them to be efficient. There is no institu-
tional profit incentive nor a personal profit incentive since none of
the net earnings may inure to the benefit of any individual.0 7 In
religious organizations, the situation is exacerbated since contribu-
tions attributable to worship and public charity are not differenti-
ated; therefore, a portion of every dollar contributed to religious
organizations goes to support worship, thereby reducing the
amount available for charitable purposes. Since a direct subsidy of
worship is unconstitutional,'08 an equivalent direct spending pro-
gram would have to be limited to charitable activities not involving
religion, but that would involve the excessive entanglement that
Chief Justice Burger worried about in Walz. 1 1 Such a program,
without more, would be more efficient than charities operated by
religious institutions.
But there is no need for a direct spending program to replace the
indirect tax subsidy to religious organizations because the level of
giving to religious organizations would remain nearly constant
104. See supra note 60.
105. Id.
106. Inefficiency in nonprofit areas is largely attributed to attenuated or lack of owner-
ship rights by participants. "Where ownership rights are attenuated, the managers of the
unowned assets have little incentive to monitor the use of those assets. The cost of monitor-
ing may be heavy in terms of time and personal relations, particularly if it yields no visible
rewards." ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 103, at 38.
107. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(C) (1986). For a discussion of private inurement, see E. LASH-
BROOKE, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 117-19 (1985).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 111-122.
109. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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without the section 170 deduction. There is no need to choose be-
tween direct or indirect expenditure. Neither is necessary. Con-
gress can extract itself from religious entanglement and save
money without doing harm to religious organizations or the ulti-
mate consumers of the charitable works by repealing the section
170 deduction for charitable contributions to religious
organizations.
D. Constitutionality
The first amendment contains two provisions with respect to re-
ligion. Congress may neither establish a religion, nor may it pro-
hibit the free exercise of religious beliefs.11
1. Establishment Clause
The establishment clause is concerned with "sponsorship, finan-
cial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity." ' The first amendment was written in response to old-
world practices and persecutions that were transplanted in the
new-world. Particularly onerous was the practice of taxing to main-
tain and support established religions." 2 This is consistent with
colonial dislike for any tax whether it be on tea, stamps, or
whatever. Virtually every colony imposed a tax for the support of a
church,1 3 and punishment was often meted out for failure to pay
taxes and tithes to support the established religion.1 4
The reaction against established religion resulted in the "convic-
tion that individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a
government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or
otherwise to assist any or all religions, .... 11115 James Madison's
famous MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE" ' was written to protest the
proposed renewal of Virginia's tax for the support of the estab-
lished church. Madison wrote: "[T]o compel a man to furnish con-
tributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he dis-
believes, is sinful and tyrannical; .... "I" The Supreme Court has
110. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
111. Waltz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
112. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947).
113. Id. at 10 n.8.
114. Id. at 9.
115. Id. at 11.




accepted Madison's ideas and objectives as being the driving force
behind the first amendment's religion clauses." 8
Mr. Justice Black in Everson stated that: "The 'establishment of
religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: . . .
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or




The difficulty is distinguishing between tax legislation which pro-
vides funds for the public welfare and that which supports religion.
The Supreme Court seems unwilling to draw such distinctions. As
long as the section 170 deduction for charitable contributions to
religious organizations is a part of the general statutory scheme al-
lowing the deduction for contributions to all eligible charitable or-
ganizations, the court is not inclined to question its
constitutionality.
Social services provided by religious organizations are so en-
twined with their religious function that it is impossible to differ-
entiate. The primary functions of religious organizations are to
tend to the spiritual well-being of the members (pastoral) and to
convert or recruit new members (propagation). For example, edu-
cational activities fall into both categories. The religious organiza-
tion seeks to instruct its own members in its religious tenants and
to recruit others through education. Virtually every social welfare
function carried on by religious organizations falls into one, the
other, or both categories. This is not surprising since that is their
mission; for it to be otherwise would be surprising. This then is the
major difference between religious organizations and the other
nonprofit organizations.
Social welfare programs operated by nonreligious organizations
clearly could be subsidized since they lack religious entanglement.
The inability to divorce the religious aspect from the social welfare
program provided by religious organizations renders them ineligi-
ble for government aid. Mr. Justice Rutledge speaking of education
in Everson said: "Commingling the religious with the secular
teaching does not divest the whole of its religious permeation and
emphasis or make them of minor part, if proportion were material.
Indeed on any other view, the constitutional prohibition always
could be brought to naught by adding a modicum of the secu-
118. See 330 U.S. at 13.
119. Id. at 16.
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lar."'"2 That is precisely the issue here. Commingling social welfare
programs with religion does not make direct aid or subsidy to reli-
gion constitutional.
"[T]he effect of the religious freedom Amendment to our Consti-
tution was to take every form of propagation of religion out of the
realm of things which could directly or indirectly be made public
business and thereby be supported in whole or in part at taxpay-
ers' expense."1"1 There is no question but that direct appropria-
tions to religious organizations to carry-on social welfare work are
unconstitutional.122 The controversy today swirls around indirect
aid to religious organizations-for example, state payments reim-
bursing parents for children's transportation costs to parochial
schools 2 and free textbooks for parochial school children. 24 The
Supreme Court justifies these "indirect" expenditures on the
grounds that they are incidental and do not benefit the religious
organization directly, but rather as in Everson, benefit parochial
school parents by reimbursing transportation costs. Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority in Walz, attempted to draw this
distinction. The chief justice said: "Obviously a direct money sub-
sidy would be a relationship pregnant with involvement and, as
with most governmental grant programs, could encompass sus-
tained and detailed administrative relationships for enforcement of
statutory or administrative standards, .... ."125 Whereas, in the
next paragraph, he said: "The grant of a tax exemption is not
sponsorship since the government does not transfer part of its rev-
enue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the
church support the state."'2 6 Obviously, the majority did not con-
sider uncollected revenue equivalent to a direct grant.
The majority in Walz completely misunderstood or deliberately
misconstrued the tax expenditure concept when it drew a distinc-
tion between a direct money subsidy and a tax exemption. For the
Court to equate the two, as the legislative and executive branches
do under the tax expenditure budget,12 7 is to render the opinion
untenable. The majority seemed more concerned with "sustained
120. Id. at 47.
121. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
122. Even Chief Justice Burger would agree with this statement. See Waltz v. Tax
Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
123. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
124. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
125. 397 U.S. at 675.
126. Id.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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and detailed administrative relationships" than with result. Their
treatment is concerned with government involvement with religion
rather than sponsorship or financial aid. Justice Brennan concur-
ring in Walz admitted that "[gleneral subsidies of religious activi-
ties would, of course, constitute impermissible state involvement
with religion. '"128 Nonetheless, he insisted on the difference be-
tween a direct transfer of public monies which he believed would
be unconstitutional and a tax exemption which be believed to be
permissible.12 This is form over substance. "The prohibition
against establishment of religion cannot be circumvented by a sub-
sidy, bonus or reimbursement of expense to individuals . "... ,130 A
tax exemption or deduction is equivalent to a direct grant.
Justice Douglas in his dissent in Walz clearly equates a tax ex-
emption with a subsidy.13' Both an exemption and deduction are
tax expenditures. 1 2 The form of the subsidy is irrelevant. If a sub-
sidy to religious organizations to support religious activities is un-
constitutional, then a tax exemption or deduction having the same
effect is also unconstitutional. If a charitable contribution to a reli-
gious organization results in a deduction, then to the extent that
the contribution supports worship or other religious activities the
result is government sponsorship of religion and violation of the
establishment clause.
2. Free Exercise Clause
The establishment clause was designed to keep separate religion
and government, while the free exercise clause was designed to
keep government out of individual choice. The free exercise clause
prohibits the government from interfering with the beliefs of any
religious individual or group. James Madison protested govern-
ment interference with religious beliefs as much as established reli-
gion. 133 It is a violation of the free exercise clause to tax a person
128. 397 U.S. at 690 (Brennan, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 690-91.
130. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 24 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
131. "[Olne of the best ways to 'establish' one or more religions is to subsidize them,
which a tax exemption does." 397 U.S. at 701 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
132. See supra note 15.
133. See 1 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 21 (G. Hunt ed. 1901).
This vexes me the worst of anything whatever. There are at this time in the adjacent
country not less than five or six well-meaning men in close jail for publishing their
religious sentiments, which in the main are very orthodox. I have neither patience to
hear, talk, or think of anything relative to this matter; ....
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for the support of a religious sect in which he disbelieves. Religion
is a matter of individual conscience, and the government is prohib-
ited from interfering by dictating which religion a person must
support by a tax levy. The same is true of a tax subsidy. Taxpayers
are compelled to support religious ideas and convictions in which
they might disbelieve through the section 170 deduction.
Denying the section 170 deduction for charitable contributions
made to religious organizations would not interfere with the belief
of any religious individual or group. First, the deduction does not
directly affect the religious organization. The deduction only inures
to the benefit of itemizing taxpayers, not the religious organization.
Whatever contribution the religious organization receives is tax ex-
empt under section 501(c)(3) whether received from a taxpayer
who itemizes or not. The status of the taxpayer as an itemizer or
nonitemizer is irrelevant to the religious organization. Moreover,
there is no indirect benefit to religious organizations since eco-
nomic studies show that the existence of the section 170 deduction
for charitable contributions to religious organizations has little ef-
fect on such contributions.13 4 Individual freedom of choice is pre-
served. Those who wish to support their religion will continue to
do so. Those who do not so wish are not indirectly forced to con-
tribute by way of government subsidy.
There is no excessive entanglement problem with respect to re-
peal of the section 170 deduction. The excessive entanglement
problem is caused by trying to separate the social welfare functions
of religious organizations from the religious function. As Chief Jus-
tice Burger stated in Walz: "[A] direct money subsidy would be a
relationship pregnant with involvement, .... .,135 A subsidy by
way of a tax deduction can be no less pregnant.
The elusive, sought-after concept of constitutional neutrality3
between the establishment and free exercise clauses can be ob-
tained by repeal of the section 170 deduction for charitable contri-
butions to religious organizations.
III. CONCLUSION
In enacting the section 170 deduction for charitable contribu-
134. See supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
135. 397 U.S. at 675.
136. "We sponsor an attitude on the part of the government that shows no partiality
to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the
appeal of its dogma." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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tions, Congress chose an indirect tax subsidy instead of a direct
spending program for certain social welfare services. A tax expen-
diture analysis of the deduction for charitable contributions to reli-
gious organizations shows that the goals of shifting the burden of
providing social welfare programs from the government to the pri-
vate sector and, as a result, promoting the general welfare are not
accomplished by the section 170 deduction for charitable contribu-
tions to religious organizations.
The section 170 deduction for charitable contributions to reli-
gious organizations is neither necessary nor desirable. Economic
studies show that repeal of section 170 for charitable contributions
to religious organizations would not materially alter the giving
levels to religious organizations because the cost of giving for most
donors to religious organizations remains high whether they item-
ize or not. Individual giving to religious organizations appears to be
more a matter of conscience than tax savings. The section 170 de-
duction is inequitable because it favors high income, itemizing tax-
payers over nonitemizing taxpayers who actually contribute the
bulk of charitable contributions to religious organizations. The sec-
tion 170 deduction for charitable contributions to religious organi-
zations is in effect a tax subsidy for high income taxpayers.
Philosophically, corporations should not be allowed to deduct
charitable contributions to religious organizations because they are
not moral agents and, hence, cannot embrace a religious belief.
Charitable giving by corporations is inconsistent with the spirit of
the first amendment and distorts free exercise.
Because of the inexorable entwining of religion and social ser-
vices provided by religious organizations, the tax subsidy raises se-
rious constitutional questions no less than a direct spending pro-
gram supporting religion. Congress can extract itself from religious
entanglement and save money without doing harm to religious or-
ganizations or the ultimate consumers of the charitable works by
repealing the section 170 deduction for charitable contributions to
religious organizations.
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